The traditional role attributed to government in collaborative R & D has been one of funding. This paper explores a new role for government in facilitating collaborative R & D, one of discouraging opportunistic behavior. Given the nature of R & D, concerns about opportunistic behavior can serve as a major barrier to the formation and effective operation of collaborative R & D. Using a transaction cost framework, we identify mechanisms by which the government can help to discourage such behavior. Specifically, we examine the Italian Societ~ di Ricerca program where the government appears to be performing this role.
I. Introduction
well known. The Japanese government began sponsoring collaborative research through Engineering Research Associations (ERAs) in the early 1960s, and they have become the major institutional mechanism used by firms to execute joint research [34] . In fact, approximately 80% of the research loans made by the Japanese government are devoted to joint projects [54] . European governments have also joined together to sponsor collaborative research in a number of areas through programs such as ESPRIT (European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technology), EUREKA (European Research Coordination Agency) and BRITE (Basic Research in Industrial Technologies for Europe). 1 Government funding of such programs is substantial, with a government budget of 750 million ECUs for the first 5-year phase of ESPRIT [51] . Finally, the US government has recently joined the bandwagon, contributing major funding to Sematech, a collaboration of US firms in the semiconductor industry. In each of these cases, government funding helped induce firms to participate in collaborative R & D.
The goal of this paper is to explore an additional role for government--one of facilitating collaborative R & D by decreasing the potential for opportunistic behavior among partners. Concerns about opportunistic behavior can serve as a major barrier to the formation and effective operation of collaborative R & D [19, 39, 46] . Firms are reluctant to commit resources to a joint project if they feel vulnerable. In many ways, the government is especially well suited to alleviate such concerns. Government can help to discourage opportunism through institutional mechanisms, such as defining the legal framework for cooperation, as well as through administrative mechanisms, such as membership in the governance body of a collaboration. In this paper, we examine the Italian Societ~ di Ricerca (research consortia) program where the government appears to be performing both institutional and administrative functions.
Our findings show that not only can the government help to discourage opportunistic behavior in collaborative R&D, but firms recognize and appreciate that role. Overall, Italian firms participating in a Societ~t di Ricerca valued government actions such as helping to establish long-term relationships and facilitating networking as much as they valued funding. In addition, there is evidence that firms learn through experience to improve their management of some aspects of collaboration, but not others. Firms with prior experience in collaborative R&D valued government assistance differently from those for whom the Societ~ was their first collaborative experience. Firms with prior experience placed significantly less value on government's institutional role of establishing a framework for cooperation than did firms without prior experience. Presumably these firms had learned to manage the initial set-up of a collaboration and felt less need for government guidance. They did not, however, learn to manage ex-post opportunistic behavior on their own, and still valued government's administrative role in controlling opportunism. In fact, these firms valued government's administrative role more highly, relative to funding, than did firms with no prior experience. It would appear that, given a comparison with the other collaborations in which they participate, these firms were more appreciative of the role of the government in controlling ex-post opportunism.
The paper is organized as follows. We first review the incentives of individual firms to participate in collaborative R & D irrespective of any government role (section 2). Despite these incentives, socially suboptimal levels of collaborative R & D may persist due to the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part of members. From a transaction cost perspective, we examine some of the problems encountered in setting up and running collaborative R & D projects (section 3). We then explore how the government can help alleviate these costs (section 4). In support of the theory, we examine the Italian Societ~ di Ricerca program (section 5). Finally, through a set of in-depth interviews with Societ~ di Ricerca participants supplemented by empirical evidence from a written survey of 39 firms participating in the program, we explore how firms perceive the role of the government in establishing and operating research collaborations (section 6).
Firm incentives for collaborative R & D
Firms have a number of alternative mechanisms for tapping the research capabilities of other firms, including acquisition, licensing, outsourcing and collaborative R & D. 2 We will not distinguish between R&D Consortia, Research Joint Ventures and other forms for organizing collaborative R&D. For our purposes, mutual commitment of resources to a research project is sufficient, regardless of legal structure. Porter and Fuller [46] treat all types qf coalitions as a class of transactions, pointing out that there ~ "no simple relationship between the legal form of coalitions and the purposes they are designed to achieve" (p. 316).
3 It is not clear that the NCRA has actually encouraged more firms to engage in cooperative R& D. The number of firms actually filing has not been particularly large [31] , and R & D executives did not consider the act an important influence on their decisions to collaborate [35] .
There are many potential reasons for firms to participate in collaborative R&D, and there is no general agreement as to which are the most important. Empirical surveys of firms participating in such collaborations, as well as case studies and game theoretic models, point to the following incentives: 4 -economies of scale in research, -economies of scope in research, -ability to finance costly projects, -avoidance of unnecessary duplication of research, 5 -risk management, -access to know-how network, -obtaining a window on related technologies, -exploitation of partners' complementary positions, -internalizing the externalities created by research spillovers. Despite these benefits, firms may still invest socially suboptimal amounts in collaborative R & D. When firms are able to increase the efficiency of their R & D efforts through collaboration, society as well as the firms benefits. Unfortunately, fear of opportunistic behavior may inhibit firms from engaging in such socially beneficial collaborative R&D. Firms may justifiably feel vulnerable to exploitation and therefore be reluctant to commit resources to collaborative projects.
We will focus on this reason for underinvestmerit in collaborative R & D and how government policy can address it. 6 Using a transaction cost framework, we will examine specifically how the potential for opportunism increases the costs of engaging in a collaboration. As Porter and Fuller [46, p. 340 ] point out, "the transaction costs of 4 This section summarizes the rationale for collaborative R&D discussed in the following references: [1, 7, 15, 16, 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 35, 36, 38, 42, 43, 48, 50, 53, 56] .
5 In some cases duplication of research efforts may be beneficial in that, if different organizations take different approaches to solving a problem, there is a higher likelihood that one will succeed. Focusing on one approach, especially in the early stages of a technology's development, may actually inhibit innovation [40] .
6 Other reasons noted for underinvestment in collaborative R & D include imperfect appropriability [15] and risk aversion. negotiating and managing coalitions are a significant barrier to coalition formation."
The transaction costs of collaborative R & D

Transaction costs and the nature of R & D
Transaction cost theory [58, 60] proposes that efficiency in executing transactions drives the organization of economic institutions. Efficiency is achieved by minimizing the sum of both production and transaction costs. Production costs include familiar items associated with the construction of a product, such as raw materials and labor. Transaction costs are less concrete. They include, for instance, the legal and management fees associated with negotiating a contract, the costs of monitoring the contract, and the cost of enforcing the contract. Whereas production costs may be lower if a firm contracts out a certain piece of work, the transaction costs associated with executing that contract may be high. If the transaction costs outweigh the savings in production costs, the firm will be better off internalizing the work.
Since transaction costs are often difficult to observe, the theory identifies conditions under which they are likely to be high. Given the presence of opportunistic behavior and bounded rationality, transactions costs are determined by four transaction characteristics: asset specificity, uncertainty, information asymmetry and transaction frequency. The nature of R & D is such that the transaction costs of establishing and running an R&D collaboration are likely to be quite high.
Collaborative R & D often involves high levels of asset specificity. When a firm performs part of a research project, the knowledge it gains may be useless unless combined with the work from other firms. In the biotechnology industry, as firms move from generic research to product development, "much more of the know-how generated is idiosyncratic to the product and firm-specific" [44, p. 247] . Thus, if products are developed jointly, the knowledge only has value in the context of this joint development.
The level of uncertainty in any R & D project, including collaborative R&D, is high. Nelson and Winter [41] criticize traditional economic views of innovation for focusing on shifts in the production function and ignoring the uncertainty surrounding the innovation process. They argue that "innovation involves uncertainty in an essential way" (p. 47). The output of the research process is uncertain in a number of aspects. (1) The absolute level of output is difficult to predict. One may anticipate a threefold increase in performance and instead obtain only a twofold increase, or perhaps even a fourfold increase. (2) The timing of results is unclear. Research projects do not provide a steady stream of results, and it is difficult to predict findings ahead of time. ( 3) The specific area in which results will be applicable is uncertain. For example, a research project meant to solve one problem may easily end up solving another [45] .
Information asymmetries are also common in collaborative R & D projects. In order to protect proprietary interests, firms often divide projects into distinct modules to be performed separately by each firm. In the Japanese VLSI project, for instance, company laboratories performed sensitive research, as opposed to the central cooperative laboratory, in order to protect proprietary information [20, 28] . By organizing projects in this manner, however, each firm has access to a different information set about how the project is progressing. It is therefore very difficult for them to monitor each other's progress.
Finally, the mere frequency of interactions in collaborative R & D may be high. If two firms' research modules are highly interdependent, then frequent communication and costly coordination may be necessary.
Since collaborative R&D typically involves high levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, information asymmetries and frequency of interaction, one would expect high transaction costs. We now examine in more detail the specific transaction costs which arise.
Ex-ante transaction costs of collaborative R & D
In structuring collaborative R&D, potential partners must reach agreement over a wide vari-ety of issues before finally deciding to work together. Given the nature of R&D, the costs associated with reaching agreement on these issues can be significant. In Boeing's joint development of the 7J7 with a group of Japanese firms, Moxon et al. [39, p. 273 ] point out, "No longer able to rely on 'the Boeing way' as a means of dispute resolution, the two firms have had to develop a much more detailed set of plans for handling the upcoming venture.., working groups spent more than a year developing concrete statements about various parts of the project and defining work shares."
In addition, the difficulties in negotiating an acceptable agreement among partners increase rapidly with the number of participants. With two firms there is one relationship to worry about, with three firms there are three relationships, with four firms, six relationships and so on. Getting a collaboration of many firms to agree can therefore be extremely difficult. 7 We have identified four areas of contention which firms must attempt to resolve in ex-ante negotiations when forming a research collaboration: (1) control of ownership; (2) distribution of research contributions and results; (3) the goals of the collaboration; (4) protection of proprietary technology.
Control of ownership
Often, disputes emerge over who will have control in a collaborative venture [29, 39] . Generally, in a two-party relationship, each player wants the majority for fear that if the other player has control, it will exploit that position. In multiparty consortia, control is still a key issue, with increased complexity arising from the larger number of parties involved. Smaller firms may feel extremely vulnerable when dealing with larger firms. Doz [19, p. 323] , in an analysis of technology partnerships, describes "an almost visceral fear on the part of managers and owners of the smaller firm, of the bigger finn taking detrimental action that the small firm cannot resist and that could put its future in jeopardy." Concerns about subgroup coalitions may also exist. Time and legal fees spent negotiating ownership can therefore be substantial, and in some cases no agreement is reached and the collaboration is abandoned. Hladik [29] describes a potential product development collaboration between Ford and Fiat which would have given each firm access to key technologies, as well as providing complementary market coverage. Unfortunately, the two firms reached a deadlock in negotiations over ownership control, and the deal was canceled.
Distribution of contributions and results
In any collaboration, rules for how much each firm should contribute and for how the profits are to be shared are difficult to establish. Firms may each feel that they contributed more than any other, or that they contributed the key personnel [6] . Agreement on the distribution and ownership of research results suffers from similar problems and is often a matter of contention in collaborative R&D, especially if the firms are potential competitors in downstream product markets [44] . The uncertainty and information asymmetries associated with R & D make it difficult for firms precisely to specify rules ex-ante. It is unclear how much of a 'contribution' will be needed in order to accomplish a given result. It is also unclear when that result has been achieved. Guidelines for who controls the day-to-day management of various pieces of the project take on increasing importance, since allocations are likely to change throughout the course of the project. The ex-ante transaction costs associated with negotiating rules for contributing and sharing can therefore be substantial. 7 Brockhoff [7, p. 519 ] argues "that firms should be able to find arrangements to deal efficiently with cooperation regardless of the numbers of partners involved." He provides empirical evidence that partially supports this proposition. However, the argument requires that the firms negotiate with the cooperative entity and not directly with each other.
Goals of the collaboration
In order for a collaboration to succeed, partners must agree on the goals of the venture. Doz [19, p. 319 ] calls this consensus 'convergence of purpose', noting the importance of common operational goals. Moxon et al. [39] refer to the im-portance of a common 'strategic direction', in other words, agreement on the product-market segment-targeted by the venture. The goals of an R & D collaboration also include definition of the technological scope and identification of criteria for prioritization of research projects.
Reaching agreement on such factors is very difficult given the transaction characteristics discussed above. The uncertainty surrounding most R & D complicates each of these decisions. For instance, firms will find it difficult to specify the scope of a collaboration or a target productmarket segment a priori since subsequent research results may shift priorities [44] . Information asymmetries also make agreement difficult. Given the knowledge available to them, each firm may have a different view as to the important areas to pursue. Reaching agreement may involve sharing of information which the firms consider proprietary. These difficulties result in high transaction costs associated with spelling out goals ex-ante.
Protection of proprietary technology
The desire of potential partners to protect proprietary technology can be a major obstacle to collaboration [39] . Firms must attempt to negotiate a governance structure which allows projects to be performed efficiently, yet without unintentionally sharing proprietary information. Many times, as mentioned earlier, firms will conduct research independently in their own laboratories in order to lessen the risk of losing intellectual property. In this case, firms must determine a logical split of the workload, forecasting interdependencies early on when there is high uncertainty about how different parts of the project will progress. This process can be lengthy, and often the firms have to renegotiate the workload at a later time.
Ex-post transaction costs of collaborative R & D
Renegotiation
Since R & D is highly uncertain, much of the ex-ante contracting which takes place is destined to be incomplete. As a result, firms often agree to decide matters at a later date, once the collaboration is underway [19, 44] . Such renegotiation can be costly and thus result in high ex-post transaction costs. In the biotechnology industry, disputes over renegotiated items often result in costly legal fees for the firms involved [44] . Even if the terms of a collaboration are well-specified, the cost of monitoring and enforcing them can be high.
Monitoring and enforcement
Monitoring progress of a collaborative research project is difficult for at least three reasons. First, information asymmetries associated with distributed research make it difficult to judge accurately whether partners are abiding by the collaborative agreement. Since the purpose of distributing research to different sites is to protect proprietary information, it is unlikely that firms will allow partners access to those facilities in order to monitor progress.
Second, the uncertainty of research results accentuates the difficulties of evaluating a partner's contributions. Firms may attempt to monitor research results or output as a substitute for visiting facilities. Since, with R& D, no simple relationship between input and output exists, however, information about results will give a firm little real data on how hard the partner is working. A direct evaluation of effort would be a better measure, but effort is very difficult to gauge [19] . Consequently, several private ordering mechanisms normally used for addressing problems of opportunistic behavior do not work in such a situation. For example, the ex-ante coupling of opportunistic behavior with ex-post sanctions--such as posting a bond that is lost if a player behaves opportunistically [24, 49] --is not a feasible alternative if it cannot be measured unambiguously ex-post whether players did fulfill their obligations. In other words, if performance cannot be gauged, as is often the case in R&D, players do not have the possibility of accepting binding commitments.
Third, as information, the results of R&D have some public good characteristics. Information can be transferred to other parties without the transferee losing it [9] . It is therefore difficult for a firm to monitor whether proprietary R & D results have leaked out, or to determine how they might have leaked. Once information has leaked, controlling its usage is nearly impossible [3] . Agreements to keep certain technologies private are therefore difficult to monitor and enforce, and once they are violated, damage control is difficult.
The expectation that one's partner in an R & D collaboration will act opportunistically may well lead to a classic prisoner's dilemma where despite the fact that two firms would be better off by jointly cooperating, both firms individually have the incentive to defect. For instance, we can think of cooperating as sending a high-caliber researcher to the consortium and defecting as sending a poor performer. Each firm may have the incentive to defect and send a poor performer, regardless of what the other firm did. If firm X sends a high caliber performer, firm Y could conceivably reap the benefits of the research without having to contribute a high caliber researcher of its own. It would therefore have an incentive to defect and send a poor performer. Likewise, if firm X sends its low caliber performer, then firm Y would also prefer to send its low-caliber performer rather than subsidize firm X's research by sending a top performer. Consequently, a 'defect-defect' outcome where both firms send poor performers is likely. Given this incentive to defect, enforcing an agreement to cooperate may be difficult.
A governmental role in controlling opportunism
We have discussed the reasons why setting up and running collaborative R & D can lead to high transaction costs. In this section we explore several measures available to government that may help to discourage opportunistic behavior and thereby reduce transaction costs. We distinguish between institutional and administrative mechanisms.
Institutional mechanisms are those activities by which government helps to establish a framework for cooperative action through, for example, changes in the legal system. By shifting aspects of the institutional environment such as property rights, contract law, reputation effects or uncertainty, the comparative costs of different governance forms are altered [59] . Naturally, government is in an especially good position to fulfill such an institutional role. Government's activities in the context of its institutional role are primarily aimed at reducing ex-ante transaction costs of a collaborative venture.
Administrative mechanisms refer to government involvement in the actual workings of the cooperation, for example through membership in governance bodies. Through such involvement, government may directly reduce ex-post transaction costs and, by doing so, indirectly reduce ex-ante costs.
Institutional mechanisms: Decreasing ex-ante transaction costs
The government can employ several mechanisms to decrease the transaction costs associated with the formation of a research collaboration. By defining an overall framework for cooperation up front, the government can limit the negotiation space, thereby reducing the number of alternatives that need to be explored. This framework can cover everything from details of the legal wording of the agreement to more general guidelines. Concerns over control can be alleviated if the government prespecifies how ownership of the collaboration will be distributed among partners, defining, for instance, rules for the allocation of shares in the case of a partnership or legal corporation. As long as they are reasonable, it may matter less in some sense what the specific rules are, than that they are there to provide guidance. The same principle holds for other issues. By providing a menu of options for the distribution of research results or the organization of projects, the government helps firms to reach agreement more easily.
One of the biggest reasons for ex-ante transaction costs is the fear of ex-post exploitation. To the extent that the government can help avoid such ex-post exploitation, it can signifcantly diminish the need for extensive contracting up front. If firms are less worried about ex-post exploitation, they will feel less need to anticipate and account for contingencies ex-ante.
Administrative mechanisms: Decreasing ex-post transaction costs
Monitoring
Axelrod [5, p. 139 ] identifies "improve recognition abilities" as one means for promoting cooperation. By recognizing defection when it occurs and remembering which players defected and which cooperated, firms are better able to cooperate. The government can help improve a firm's ability to 'recognize' and to 'remember'.
At an operational level, the collaboration could assign monitoring rights to the government. For instance, the government could appoint an auditor to examine ongoing research projects and ensure that firms are abiding by the intent of their original agreement. If research is being performed at multiple laboratories, this third-party auditor could visit each participant's site to evaluate progress. Though unable to eliminate uncertainty, the auditor can certainly help reduce some of the information asymmetries discussed earlier.
Such an individual would also facilitate information transfer among participants, if so desired.
Through its involvement over time, the government can help to serve as a memory which spans multiple projects. Knowledge of the level of cooperation on prior projects can be made available to firms other than just the project participants. This type of tracking can increase peer pressure to cooperate.
Threat of reprisal
The government may have both explicit and implicit power to enforce agreements among firms. If government sponsors a collaboration, it will generally have representation on a board or advisory committee which overseas the operation of the collaboration. This board or committee may give the government the legal power to discipline firms which do not abide by the intent of the agreement.
Even without such explicit control, the government may have implicit power resulting from its ability to exclude firms from future collaborations if they appear uncooperative. For instance, Levy and Samuels [34] argue that Japanese firms feel obliged to cooperate with MITI so that they will continue to be included in future projects.
The ability of the government to enforce an agreement can help to avoid the prisoner's dilemma discussed above. In order to avoid the 'defect-defect' outcome, both finns in a prisoner's dilemma could communicate and agree beforehand to cooperate. In order for such an agreement to succeed, however, each firm needs both to ignore its own incentive to defect and to trust that the other firm will do the same. Like the monopolist in the classic Coase problem, the firms must find a way to commit to strategies that appear irrational. The question is how they can do so. The government can help by providing firms with the necessary commitment device. The threat of reprisal, while not the equivalent of 'burning the bridge behind the army', can be an effective commitment mechanism. As Levy and Samuels [34, p. 128] point out, "In the absence of a state authority which rewards cooperation and occasionally punishes defection, research consortia are almost never established among competing firms."
Establishing long-term relationships
Another way to promote cooperation and avoid the problems of a prisoner's dilemma is through the establishment of long-term relationships. This approach works for two primary reasons. First, by extending the life span of the cooperation, the penalty for defecting is more severe. A firm that defects will face punishment over a long series of future relationships. Depending upon how much weight a firm places on future cash flows, the prospect of losing these future relationships may outweigh the temporary gain to be had by defecting [5, 49] . This result is demonstrated formally by game theorists through folk theorems [22] .
The second way in which a long-term relationship encourages cooperation is that it allows for enough interaction to establish a pattern of reciprocal, or tit-for-tat, behavior. Such behavior, where a firm responds to every move by emulating the prior move of its opponent, can encourage cooperation [5] . For instance, the long-term stability of players in Japanese collaborations has made it easier to establish such self-policing behavior [34] .
Clearly long-term relationships can help foster cooperation. How, then, can the government facilitate the establishment of such relationships? First, government involvement can help to establish continuity and stability in a collaboration, increasing the likelihood that firms will work together in the future. Firms therefore view their relationships as long term. Second, the government provides firms a chance to publicly demonstrate their willingness to cooperate. Buckley and Casson [8] suggest that by establishing a reputation for forbearance, through, for instance, a conspicuous public demonstration, a firm is more likely to form collaborative efforts. Third, as discussed earlier, by monitoring collaborations and providing the equivalent of an organizational memory of how firms have performed in previous collaborations, the government extends the timehorizon of interactions, helping to encourage cooperation. Finally, the government can provide a forum for firms to establish long-term networks. If firms can become acquainted with one another before collaborating, the chances that their collaboration will succeed may increase. In addition, if firms feel they are part of a network, self-policing behavior among members of the network may be stronger.
We have thus seen that theoretically the government can play a significant role in controlling the potential for opportunistic behavior in collaborative R& D. We now examine how the Italian government plays this role in the Societ~ di Ricerca program. We review how the program is structured, as well as reporting the results of a survey of firms participating in the program.
Government's role in the Italian Societ~ di Ricerca
'SocietY' from now on 8). We interviewed the director of the Societ~ program and the general manager of each of eight Societ~ in order to get an understanding of how the program operated. We then contacted several member firms of two Societ~ and interviewed the individual responsible for the liaison. Interviews lasted from 1 to 4 hours.
Building on the information collected during our interviews, we developed a written survey for firms participating in a Societ~ in order to understand how they viewed the government's role.
The survey was pre-tested and, in the fall of 1991, mailed/faxed to all 104 firms participating in a Societa. For one Societh, Tecnotessile, we received only two responses from 24 partners. Approximately two-thirds of the partners had been members for less than 1 year and felt uncomfortable answering the survey given their lack of experience with the SocietY. We therefore excluded Tecnotessile from our analysis. We have no reason to believe that this biased our results. 9 For the other seven Societh, from an overall sample of 80 partners, 39 questionnaires were returned, giving us a response rate of 49%.
Overuiew of the Societft di Ricerca
A Societ~ di Ricerca is a government-sponsored research consortium comprising mostly private Italian firms, but also including private and public research centers and universities. Foreign entities are not allowed to join. Each Societ~ is incorporated, and members are all shareholders. A Societ~ mainly sponsors applied research projects, with the goal of producing research results. It does not become involved in the product market.
Methodology
In order to understand the Italian government's role in controlling opportunism, we conducted semi-structured interviews in conjunction with a survey of firms participating in a Societ~ di Ricerca (research consortium; referred to as 8 The plural of Societ~ is also SocietY. 9 Turnover at the other Societh has been mininial. Of the original founding partners, 90% are still members.
10 Legge 25 ottobre 1968, no. 1089, art. 4, comma 1.
Societ?a di Ricerca were established by Italian Act 1089 in 1968. The general purpose of the act was:
...speeding the progress and the development of the national industrial system and the adoption of more advanced techniques and technologies. 10
The government implemented the act through IMI, a government-owned financial holding company, which serves as its agent in the context of the SocietY. 11 The sponsorship of Societh was one of multiple mechanisms utilized to fulfill the objectives of the act. 12 The act identifies four broad goals, which serve as guidelines for the operations of a Societ~ [14]. 1. To promote, perform and/or manage applied research projects autonomously or for third parties. 2. To participate in public research contracts. 3. To transfer technological knowledge to small firms. 4. To act as a link between industry and the national scientific community.
tl IMI is a publicly held financial institution whose controlling shareholder is the Ministry of Treasury. IMI initially specialized in medium-and long-term financing for industrial activities [11] . Over time, IMI has widened its scope to include direct participation in investment and merchant banking, as well as the provision and management of investment funds, mutual funds and life insurance products. IMI's role in the country's economic system has been shaped by law rather than by political appointments, thus sheltering it from current politics. Consequently, IMI acts here as a government agency, abiding by well-established legal mandates as opposed to the dictates of the current government. The decision to give IMI a prominent role in the management and control in the Societ~ should then be considered within the policy framework established by Act 1089. Given its institutional role, IMI provides a link between government efforts to encourage R&D and the country's industrial system. 12 IMI has two other mechanisms at its disposal for accomplishing this goal, directly lending funds at a subsidized rate to privately sponsored projects, and directly granting funds to privately sponsored projects. Projects sponsored by a Societ~ are eligible to apply for these two types of funding. These two modes of supporting technological development are clearly financial and they have been studied in some depth [2, 4, 21, 37, 55] . However, few studies, have focused on the third mechanism, the formation of Societ~ [17, 47] .
Members contribute fees to cover operating costs. In addition, projects sponsored by the Societ~ are eligible to apply for government funding. There is no guarantee that funding will be forthcoming, although a majority of projects do receive government support. A 1990 study [10, p. 41] calculated that from 1985 to 1989, the government allocated roughly $60 million in loans and capital to the SocietY.
To establish a Societh in a given field, a group of interested and eligible partners may initiate the process by submitting a proposal. Alternatively, IMI may identify a set of partners with complementary interests and bring them together to submit a proposal. The proposals are approved by the Ministry of Treasury. Historically, Societ~ have been established in both ways, and no proposal has been rejected. As of July 1993, all eight Societ~ established to date were active, and no proposals for the formation of new ones were pending. Table 1 provides a brief overview of these eight Societ~ and their progress. Overall, the program has had promising results, with 91 projects successfully completed over its life, resulting in 33 patent applications and 35 marketable products. In addition, the results of 54 projects are in the process of being further developed by either the participating firms or the SocietY.
The Societ~ themselves vary greatly. They cover both 'high tech' industries such as pharmaceuticals, and 'lower tech' industries such as food. The number of partners ranges from a low of six in SAGO, the health management SocietY, to a high of 24 in Tecnotessile, the textiles Societ?t. Some subset of these partners participate on each project. In addition, each partner can participate in multiple projects. The range of participation varies from a low of 0.5 projects per partner for Tecnotessile, where several partners are new and have yet to begin projects, to 8.1 projects per partner for Tecnomare.
Despite these differences, each Societ?~ is set up in a similar fashion and governed by a similar set of rules. The establishment of these rules by the government helps establish a framework for cooperation and lowers the ex-ante transaction costs associated with forming a SocietY.
Societ3 institutional mechanisms: Establishing a framework for cooperation
Predefine share distribution
When a new Societ~t is founded, its shares are distributed among the participating firms according to the following rules: -IMI holds a relative majority, usually about 30%. Since a three-quarters majority is needed to approve any major decision by the SocietY, this shareholding gives the government the power of veto; -remaining shares are divided equally among the members; -small firms can join together to form a 'subconsortium' which owns the same share as each of the larger firms; -if several firms belong to the same holding company, the sum of their shares must be less than IMI's share; -after the Societ~t has been established, the entry of a new partner must be approved by a majority of the shareholders. As an example, the share distribution of Tecnobiomedica, one of the SocietY, is presented in Fig. 1 . IMI holds the relative majority (28%), with the other partners each holding the same share (6.5%). Furthermore, the partners include large independent firms (C.G.R, Elettronica), firms controlled by the major holding companies (Sorin (FIAT), Esaote Biomedica (IRI)) and small firms, represented by the consortium Corites.
By prespecifying equal distribution of ownership shares among potential partners, the govern- An independent third party, IMI, holds the relative majority. In addition, the problem of encquraging smaller firms to participate is solved l by allowing them to join as a group. Smaller firms should feel less fear of being dominated by larger firms in a collaboration since, in aggregate, they hold an equal share. Concerns over domination by a single holding company are also alleviated, since no holding company is allowed to oWn a larger share than the government. In addition to rules for share distribution, the government provides guidelines for forming the collaboration.
Provide guidelines for an organization charter
Two major documents are signed by the partners in order to form a SocietY: the Statuto and the Patti Parasociali. The Statuto is the formal incorporation document which establishes the Societ~ as an organization which must abide by Italian corporate law. It establishes standard items such as the identity of the shareholders. The Patti Parasociali specifies agreements particular to this corporation. In this case, for instance, the distribution of research results is covered.
Whereas for a private research consortium the partners would have to negotiate the content of these two documents from scratch, in this case IMI provides clear guidance. Based on government guidelines [14], IMI establishes norms for voting, controlling procedures and distribution of results. Specific wording is even suggested for major sections of the relevant documents. IMI thus defines the contractual content of the relations within the Societ?t, avoiding any need for extensive negotiation.
For example, results for all Societ?t are distributed as follows. Once a project is completed, there is a period of time during which the Societ?~ has proprietary ownership of the results. During this period, partners active on the project have the exclusive right to use the results either as licensees or through other mechanisms. The length of this period varies depending upon factors such as the length of the project and its overall budget. By the end of the period, the active partners must repay any outstanding government loans related to the project in order to obtain ownership of the results. If they do not do so, they lose any proprietary rights to the innovation and other partners in the Societl can apply for licenses. Based on our interviews with the management of each Societl, it appears that the active partners have always paid the loans back and kept ownership. Although, in some ways, specifying such a charter limits the flexibility of the collaboration by providing a predefined framework for cooperation, it eases the process of getting together, thereby decreasing ex-ante transaction costs.
Reference learning from prior Societ~
Perhaps one of the greatest assets IMI has to contribute to a Societ~ is its experience with other Societh. This experience gives the IMI an understanding of potential pitfalls to avoid, and helps to establish a culture of cooperation, t3 It also decreases the uncertainty associated with formation of a Societ~t since firms can look to the experience of existing Societ~t. In order to facilitate the transfer of learning across SocietY, the same individual from IMI sits on the boards of multiple Societ~ [47]. This individual is therefore able to provide a knowledgeable perspective on issues confronting each SocietY. Thus, IMI's participation in each Societh fosters learning within a given Societ~ as well as across Societa. 13 Watkins [57, p. 101] raises a similar point regarding the "umbrella-consortia organizational design of Eureka and Esprit", pointing out that the history of previous collaborative research agreements "provide established norms and rules for cooperation".
Societ3 administrative mechanisms: Improving ex-post monitoring and enforcement
Avoid domination by a single firm or coalition of firms
The Italian government helps ensure that no single firm or coalition of firms dominates the Societ?~ through two mechanisms. First, given the ownership and voting structure discussed above, IMI can basically veto any proposed action through its shares. This structure keeps any single firm or coalition of firms from unilaterally imposing its will on the Societh. Second, the equal division of the remaining shares, regardless of the size of the firms involved, assures equal opportunities to both large and small firms. Smaller firms have the same voting rights as large firms and need not worry about being dominated.
Ensure management follows the legal charter
In addition to using equity, IMI wields control through membership on the two supervisory 
4.3. Specify an independent project manager
Each project performed through a Societh has an independent project manager who works for the SocietL This individual supervises the execution of individual projects, coordinating the ongoing efforts of participating firms. 14 Project managers are generally highly qualified individuals, and often hold advanced degrees. As a representative from one member firm commented:
The Societh provides us an important administrative service. Since every project requires coordination because of the different parties involved, the Societ?~ assigns a project manager. I speak with the manager of our project about three times a week, and he is very involved and very helpful.
The project manager helps to control opportunistic behavior in two ways. First, (s)he is, in some sense, performing the role of a third party auditor described earlier. By following the detailed progress of the project through frequent conversations with each firm as well as site visits, the project manager is able to diminish the information asymmetries associated with distributed research. (S)he can share each participant's current status with other participants. The Societh project manager can visit a firm's research facilities without the firm worrying as much about leaking proprietary information to a competitor. As the general manager of one Societ~t told us:
The partners know that we will assure confidentiality on what we see during our visits to their research sites. They agree to work with the Societ~ because they know that they do not run any risk of information leakage on other research they are performing.
Second, the project manager provides consistency and continuity across multiple projects, 14 The eight existing Societ~ can be classified into two broad categories: (1) coordinating Societ~t (five); (2) operating Societ~ (three). In a coordinating Societ~t, research is distributed among the partners and performed with their own human resources and facilities. The Societ~ performs a predominantly administrative function through the project manager. In the second case, an operating SocietY, a project manager is also provided. The Societh, however, not only coordinates, but also executes the project using its own human resources and facilities. If partners have specific expertise, then they are also involved in projects as external contractors. The partner then receives its fee for the research as well as benefiting indirectly through its ownership interest in the Societh. The role of the independent project manager is most critical in a coordinating SocietL helping to decrease the perceived hazards of the collaboration. Firms can observe how the structure has worked in prior projects and feel more comfortable about their own project. In addition, learning may be more easily shared across projects.
Provide long-term perspectives
As discussed above, long-term relationships are important in fostering trust among firms and avoiding a prisoner's dilemma. The government helps to establish a long-term perspective through a number of mechanisms. IMI's share ownership provides continuity in spite of potential changes in SocietY' membership. In a private consortium, members would be more vulnerable to turnover. The comments of a representative from one member firm exemplify this concern:
My firm participated in a private research consortium with eight other firms about 10 years ago. The consortium fell apart, with three of the original nine firms going out of business. The rest of us are left paying the debt. With the SocietY, IMI's presence provides us some sense of stability.
In addition to providing continuity, IMI serves as an organizational memory which spans SocietY. Each firm builds a history of projects with IMI.
By not cooperating, it risks its reputation not only within its SocietY, but with other Societ~ and with IMI. Therefore, firms do not view each project as an isolated relationship, but instead take a longer-term perspective.
Finally, through holding bimonthly meetings of the representatives from each firm in a SocietY, IMI provides a forum for exchanging ideas and establishing long-term personal relationships. This 'sponsored' networking provides a way of finding project partners with whom a prior relationship exists. Firm representatives are not meeting for the first time when they consider working together, but instead have established at least some basis for trust. As a representative from one firm stated:
By meeting all together every two months, we are able to establish a higher level of trust and also be aware of what other firms are doing.
When asked in the written survey whether the firm was more likely to participate in government-sponsored collaborations in the future, given its experience with the SocietY, the mean response on a seven-point scale (1, much less likely; 7, much more likely) was 5.6, also indicating that Table 2 Potential benefits provided by a Societ~
Variable Definition
Provide Funding a Membership in the Societ~ improves access to government funding a
Institutional mechanisms to decrease ex-ante transaction costs
Establish framework The Societ~ predefines items such as there ownership and distribution of research results for cooperation
Administrative mechanisms to decrease ex-post transaction costs
Guarantee Project Completion The Societ~ helps guarantee that the other partners will complete their part of the project Avoid Conflicts
The Societ~ will help to avoid potential conflicts with partners Establish Long-Term Relations The Societ~ helps firms to establish long-term relationships with partners Facilitate Networking
The Societ~ provides a network through which firms can find the most suitable project partner
Benefit not related to transaction costs Offer Technical Expertise Employees of the Societ~ have technical expertise which members can access a Provide Funding combines two original variables. The first addressed the overall increased likelihood of receiving government funding as a member of a SocietY. The second addressed the help provided by the Societ~t in the complicated process of applying for government funding of joint projects. In our interviews, firms made it clear that assistance with the application significantly increased the odds of receiving funding. The two were therefore treated as one construct representing improved access to government funding.
the Societ~ program was effective in encouraging future relationships.
How do Societ~ participants view the government's role?
The structure of the Societ~t program, as discussed above, suggests that the government's role is much more than simply funding. The government, through IMI, helps to control opportunism via multiple mechanisms. We believe that member firms both perceive and value this additional governmental role. This hypothesis was tested through a survey of 39 firms participating in a SocietY. The focus of the survey was to understand why firms participated in a governmentsponsored research consortium rather than simply forming one on their own. Did they view government's role in the Societ~ as simply providing funds, or were other aspects of government's involvement also important in influencing their decision to join?
Measuring firms' perceptions: Determination of variables
To address this issue, each firm was asked, in the written survey, why it chose to execute joint research projects through a Societ~ as opposed to through an independent research consortium. They were asked to rate the importance of seven different benefits of a SocietY. These seven benefits were based on our earlier interviews and are defined in Table 2 .
The traditional benefit which firms expect from a government-sponsored consortium, preferential access to funding, is represented by the first variable, Provide Funding. Institutional mechanisms by which the government decreases the ex-ante transaction costs of initiating collaborative research are represented by the variable Establish Framework for Cooperation. Administrative mechanisms by which the government decreases ex-post transaction costs are represented by four variables: Guarantee Project Completion; Avoid Conflicts; Establish Long-Term Relations; Facilitate Networking. Finally, Offer Technical Expertise reflects the high level of technical knowledge resident in some of the SocietY. A firm may join to gain access to particular technological experts.
In order to understand the relative importance of these reasons for participation, respondents rated them in two ways. (1) Each reason was rated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 7 (very important) in influencing the firm's decision to perform a project through a Societ~ rather than through a nongovernment-sponsored consortium. (2) The respondent ordered these same reasons according to their relative importance on an interval scale. Respondents were instructed to write the number of the most important item at the top of the scale, and the number of the least important item at the bottom of the scale. Other items were then placed in between, with the distance between items representing their relative importance. Values between 1 and 8 were assigned to each item depending upon its position on the scale. For instance, if all eight items were equally spaced along the scale, the most important item would be assigned a value of 8, the next most important item assigned a value of 7, and so on. If, on the other hand, four items were clustered at the top of the scale, and four clustered at the bottom, the top four would receive a score of 8 and the bottom four a score of 1.
While our first measure represents the independent ratings of the items, the second measure forces a relative comparison of them. To capture both of these dimensions, we added the two ratings together, using the sum as the basis of the analysis. 15 This final rating was rescaled to run from zero to one in order to make comparisons of ratings easier to understand.
The relative importance of controlling opportunism as opposed to funding
Firms apparently appreciate government's involvement in a research consortium not only for ~5 The results are not sensitive to which measure is used; doing the analysis using only the first measure or only the second measure yields the same results as using the sum of the two. 
The role of prior experience
The literature on collaborative ventures as well as that on organizational learning 16 indicate that, through experience, firms can develop expertise in forming and carrying out such ventures. Harrigan [26] feels that part of a firm's competency can be expertise in forming joint ventures. Ciborra [13, p. 59] also supports this view, pointing out that "a firm can learn how to set up and fine tune alliances per se. The result of such learning is the institutionalization of the organization's rules and routines aimed at managing alliances." Brockhoff [7] , using a sample of 135 German firms, observes that prior experience with inter-firm cooperation seems to reduce transaction cost problems. Finally, Simonin and Helleloid [52] find that firms do develop 'collaborative know-how' through experience in international strategic alliances.
If firms do learn to manage collaborations better, one would expect to find that firms with experience in prior collaborative ventures would place less value on governmental assistance in controlling opportunism than do firms without prior experience. An experienced firm may feel it knows, for instance, how to set up the initial agreement or to make sure projects are completed. An inexperienced firm, on the other hand, should better appreciate the government performing these roles. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
Hl: Firms with prior experience in collaborative R&D will place less value on governmental help in decreasing transaction costs than firms without any prior experience.
An alternative hypothesis, however, is that firms with prior experience in collaborative R & D have first-hand knowledge of the difficulties encountered in organizing and operating such a collaboration. The observation that most cooperative endeavors do not succeed in the long run [32, 33] could suggest that firms tend to underesti-16A large body of related literature has examined learning and collaboration in terms of a firm's ability to learn from its partners in a collaboration (see Dodgson [18] for a summary). With experience, firms can do a better job of technology transfer. Essentially, they learn to learn. While not directly related to controlling opportunism, this literature might imply that firms can also learn to manage opportunistic behavior in a better way. mate the difficulties involved with inter-firm cooperation. Consequently, firms that have experienced the challenges involved in cooperation might place more value on government assistance than firms without prior experience. Firms with prior experience have a basis for comparison and may better appreciate the role performed by the government. This rationale leads to a second, alternative hypothesis: To test these hypotheses, firms were grouped into those that have participated in prior research collaborations (labeled 'with prior experience') and those for whom the Societa was their first collaborative experience (labeled 'without prior experience'). The results of comparing these two groups are presented in table 4 . Two types of analysis were performed. (1) Comparing relative importance; this analysis is an extension of the analysis performed for the whole population. Within each group, the mean of Provide Funding is compared to the mean of each other variable using a t statistic. (2) Comparing absolute importance; the mean of each variable for firms with prior experience is compared to the mean for firms without prior experience using a t statistic.
Comparing relative importance
In comparing firms with and without prior experience, we find that the validity of our two hypotheses depends upon whether we consider government's institutional mechanisms or its administrative mechanisms. When examining the importance of institutional mechanisms relative to funding, we find support for the first hypothesis. For firms with prior experience in joint research, the mean importance of Establish Framework for Cooperation is lower than the importance of Provide Funding. For firms without prior experience, however, there is no significant difference between the two means. This result supports the view that firms can learn to set up collaborations on their own. Firms with experience develop a better sense of the important issues, and perhaps can even use their prior collaborative agreements as a starting point for future agreements. They therefore place less value on the government performing this role. Firms without experience value the preset framework Table 4 Firms with prior experience: (1) learn to control ex-ante transaction costs and place less value on institutional mechanisms; (2) value administrative mechanisms as highly as funding a more highly, since they have less knowledge of how to handle all the details of organizing a collaboration. If we examine administrative mechanisms, however, we find support for our second, alternative hypothesis. For firms with prior experience in collaborative R&D, on average, administrative mechanisms were as important as funding in driving a firm's decision to join a SocietY. Avoid Conflicts, which was rated as significantly lower than Provide Funding for the overall sample, was not significantly lower for the subset of firms with experience. For firms with no prior experience, however, all of the administrative mechanisms, including Avoid Conflicts, were rated as significantly less important than funding. Thus, as far as administrative mechanisms are concerned, firms with prior experience placed more relative value on governmental help in decreasing transactions costs than did firms without experience. Perhaps firms with experience in other consortia are, in fact, better able to appreciate the role the government plays in facilitating ex-post cooperation among partners since they have something to compare the experience to. They appreciate this part of government's contribution as much as they do funding.
Comparing absolute importance
When comparing the absolute importance of each factor for firms with and without prior experience, we find that the results also depend strongly on whether institutional or administrative mechanisms are considered. When examining institutional mechanisms, results are consistent with the prior analysis: hypothesis (1) is supported. Establish Framework for Cooperation is rated lower by firms with prior experience than by those with no prior experience.
An examination of administrative mechanisms provides very weak support for hypothesis (2) . While not statistically significant, the average rating of administrative mechanisms is higher for firms with prior experience than for firms without, lending some support to the conclusions of the prior analysis.
Finally, we find that firms with prior experience have significantly reduced expectations regarding the importance of receiving governmental funding. The absolute importance of Provide Funding is significantly lower for firms with prior experience in a collaboration than for firms without prior experience.
We therefore see that the validity of hypotheses (1) and (2) depends upon whether one is discussing the institutional or administrative mechanisms employed by the government. The results are summarized in table 5. For institutional mechanisms such as establishing a framework for cooperation, hypothesis (1) appears to be valid. It would seem that firms with experience can indeed learn how to organize a collaboration up front, and place less value on the government performing that role. For administrative mechanisms aimed at controlling ex-post opportunistic behavior, however, hypothesis (2) appears to be more valid. Firms with prior experience appreciate how difficult it is to manage a collaboration ex-post, and place more value on governmental assistance. ~7 Administrative mechanisms aimed at controlling ex-post opportunism may therefore be more important and should, perhaps, receive more emphasis from policy-makers.
Conclusion
In light of the large number of firms participating in collaborative research projects, defining an appropriate role for government in such projects is a salient issue for policy-makers. While traditionally discussion has focused on determining a suitable level of government funding for collaborative R & D, the purpose of this paper was to articulate an additional role for the government, 17 There are many possible alternative explanations for the differences found between firms with and without prior experience. We have ruled out as many of these rival hypotheses as possible, and summarize the results here.
(1) Firm size. When the sample is split into large and small firms, based on 1990 sales, all of the firms that have not participated in other joint research are classified as 'small'. To ensure that experience was not simply a proxy for firm size, the analysis was repeated using only the population of small firms; the same pattern of differences between firms with and without prior experience was found. Firm size is therefore not responsible for the results. (2) Type of SocietY, coordinating or operating. All of the firms without prior experience were members of coordinating Sociat~. To ensure that experience was not simply a proxy for Societ~ type, the analysis was repeated using only the population of firms belonging to coordinating Societ?i; the same pattern of differences between firms with and without prior experience was found. The type of Societ~ is therefore not responsible for the results. (3) Firm tenure with the SocietY. There is no statistically significant difference between the tenure of firms with prior experience vs. those without. There is also no statistically significant difference between the number of projects completed within the SocietY. Tenure is therefore not responsible for the results. (4) Firm location; north vs. south. There is not a substantial difference in the composition of the firms with and without experience, in terms of geographic dispersion. Firm location is therefore not responsible for the result. (5) Societ~ industry. When the sample is split by SocietY, there is no significant difference between the ratings of the reasons for participation. Societ~ industry is therefore not responsible for the result. one of facilitating collaborative R&D through overcoming opportunistic behavior. Using a transaction cost framework, we have shown how the government, through institutional and administrative mechanisms, can help to decrease both the ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs associated with collaborative R&D. By providing an up-front framework and then helping to monitor and enforce agreements, the government fosters cooperation among firms. This role was evident in the organization and operation of the Italian government-sponsored Societ~t di Ricerca program. Through a survey of firms participating in a SocietY, we were able to confirm that firms recognize and value government performance of this role. Our specific findings are summarized as follows: -For the overall population, firms rated government's role in guaranteeing project completion, establishing long-term relationships and facilitating networking just as highly as providing funding in driving their decision to perform research through a SocietY. -Firms with prior experience in joint research learn how to organize the collaboration ex-ante. They placed significantly less value on government's institutional role in establishing a framework for cooperation than did firms with no prior experience. -Firm's with prior experience in joint research, however, do not learn to control ex-post opportunism. Instead, they become more cognizant of government performing that role. They rated administrative mechanisms aimed at ex-post transaction costs at least as important as funding in their decision to perform research through a SocietY. In contrast, firms without prior experience rated funding as a significantly more important influence than administrative mechanisms. These results raise several important questions regarding government's involvement in collaborative research. First, they suggest that government can play an important role as a quasi-neutral third party. Government, however, often has its own agenda. It may voice opinions about the content of the collaboration, favoring specific approaches and solutions. Thus, under some cir-cumstances it might not be able to fulfill this role. In the case of the Italian Societ?~ di Ricerca, government appears to be relatively neutral. It is interested in the success of these SocietY, but not in specific content issues.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that government may favor some actors, for example, large firms with which it frequently interacts, over others. Consequently, small firms might no longer perceive government as a neutral actor--they actually might oppose government involvement because it could shift the balance of power even more to the large firms. As suggested by Brockhoff [7] , this perception is held by several small technology-intensive firms in Germany. Again, this does not appear to be the case with the Societ?~ di Ricerca. In our interviews with small firms, we found no similar sentiment. One of the goals of the program is, in fact, to encourage technology transfer to smaller firms. Perhaps with this in mind, the government is more careful about ensuring equitable treatment.
Finally, the cost of government involvement may be an issue. Government programs have a way of growing, creating large self-perpetuating bureaucracies. In the case of the Societ?a program, however, the overhead appears to be minimal. The existing administrative structure of IMI was used, with the addition of a few employees devoted exclusively to the Societ~ program. In fact, relative to outright funding of technology development, sponsoring collaborations may be viewed as an inexpensive way to leverage private resources.
While government funding is still an important issue, these results imply that government may want to increase its emphasis on supporting cooperation by helping to control opportunism, especially ex-post monitoring and enforcement. Through explicitly acknowledging the importance of this role and directly exploring ways to perform it best, the government can more effectively encourage cooperation. Additional research on the best way to structure a collaboration that incorporates an independent party, for instance, promises to provide useful insights.
The government may not be the only player able to play this role. Other third parties, for example industry associations or independent research institutions such as universities, may be in a position to help set up, monitor or enforce agreements among firms. While government has some inherent advantages in fulfilling the institutional role of supporting interfirm cooperation, other institutions might be in a better position to fulfill the administrative role due to specific knowledge advantages. As shown in this paper, both might contribute significantly to the success of collaborative R & D.
